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owning pensioners for reduced benefits. We also explain why the PAYG system may have
lost its appeal even for pensioners after its introduction.
JEL Classification: H55, H21, I38.
Keywords: social security reform, fixed factor, pay-as-you-go system, capital gains taxation.
Marko Köthenbürger











A previous version of the paper circulated under the title “Social Security Reform with a
Fixed Factor”. We are grateful for useful comments from Ulrich Hange, Roisin Hearn,
Katarina Keller, Etienne Lehmann, Ismo Risku, Hans-Werner Sinn, Bas van Groezen, Harrie
Verbon and other participants in seminars at CES in June 2001 and VATT in September
2001, the European Public Choice Society Annual Meeting in Belgirate, Italy, April 4-7,
2002, the Spring Meeting of Young Economists in Paris, April 18-20, 2002, the EEA Annual
Meeting in Venice, Italy, August 22-24, 2002, and the IIPF Annual Conference in Helsinki,
Finland, August 26-29, 2002. Earlier versions of the paper were written while Poutvaara was
employed first at the Department of Economics, University of Helsinki, and then at the
Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT). Financial support from the Danish
Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs is gratefully acknowledged, while none of our
employers are responsible for our conclusions.1 Introduction
In most, if not all, Western countries participation in the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social se-
curity system does not seem attractive for the current younger generations. The expected
rate of return on social security contributions is considerably lower than the expected
rate of return on ﬁnancial investments. Lower and even negative population growth only
aggravates the burden that a PAYG system imposes on younger generations. This has
stimulated a considerable interest in a social security reform in which the PAYG system
would be replaced at least partially by a funded component taking advantage of a higher
market rate of return.
The existence of a higher rate of return in a fully-funded system may suggest that a
Pareto-improving transition to a fully-funded system is possible. Gains in pension claims
of future generations are expected to be suﬃciently high to compensate the pensioners of
the transition generation for the reduction in their beneﬁts. Though shaping the political
and academic discussion on pension reform1, this argument lacks a general theoretical
foundation. According to Fenge (1995) and Brunner (1996), a Pareto-improving tran-
sition is not feasible once an intragenerationally-fair PAYG system2 is in place. If the
elderly are compensated for the lost beneﬁts using public debt, then the implicit tax im-
posed by the PAYG system is converted into an explicit tax levied to service public debt.
The discounted value of the tax burden, however, remains unchanged, indicating that
the intertemporal eﬃciency gains are neutralized by higher distortionary explicit taxes
on future generations (Sinn, 2000). Notably, the “arithmetic” of PAYG reform holds
independently of the magnitude of pre-existing general wage taxes.3
In this paper, we introduce a diﬀerent mechanism through which the elderly participate
1Most prominently, Feldstein (1996) advocates replacing PAYG system by a funded one based on this
argument. In contrast, see Diamond (1996) for a critical evaluation of the rate-of-return argument in
restructuring social security.
2A PAYG system is intragenerationally fair if contributions are not used for intragenerational income
redistribution. Such a system imposes an implicit tax equal for all members of a generation.
3The Pareto-eﬃciency of the PAYG system has ﬁrst been demonstrated in Breyer (1989) and Verbon
(1989). In contrast to Fenge and Brunner, Breyer and Verbon assume an exogenous labor supply and
a PAYG system with lump-sum contributions and pension beneﬁts. Besides the explanation presented
above, the Pareto-eﬃciency of the PAYG system in Breyer and Verbon can be explained by invoking
the Second Welfare Theorem. Since the initial allocation is undistorted and a reform of the PAYG
system is equivalent to a lump-sum redistribution of incomes between generations, no reform can yield a
Pareto-improvement.
2in the future eﬃciency gains created by a decrease in the PAYG tax rate. This mechanism
consists of voluntary market transactions in the ﬁxed factor, here labeled as land. Land
should be interpreted broadly to include all factors of production capitalized in the stock
market. The presence of a ﬁxed factor has two implications in our model. First, the
economy is dynamically eﬃcient, i.e. the interest rate exceeds the output growth rate
(Homburg, 1991 and Rhee, 1991). Second, that part of the future eﬃciency gains which
accrues to land is immediately capitalized in its current value. If suﬃciently high, the
increase in land value outweighs the loss from cutting social security beneﬁts for the old
land owners. The empirical relevance of our analysis derives from two dramatic changes
in U.S. retirement saving during the last two decades. These are the transition from
deﬁned beneﬁt plans to deﬁned contribution plans, and the associated huge increase in
the value of pension assets. Poterba et al. (2001)r e p o r tt h a ti n1980 59 percent of private
retirement savings were in employer-based deﬁned beneﬁt plans while currently 85 percent
are to deﬁned contribution plans in which individuals decide on the level and investment
of their contributions. At the same time, the ratio of all private retirement assets to wage
and salary earnings quadrupled. This suggests that increased private asset wealth has
moved the interests of retirees and workers near retirement closer to those of the younger
generations concerning reduction in PAYG tax rates.
We analyze an overlapping generations model in which each cohort lives for three
periods. During the ﬁr s tp e r i o do fl i f e ,t h em e m b e r so ft h ec o h o r ti n v e s tp r i v a t e l yi n
education. In the second period of life, they supply labor services equal to their human
capital to production and purchase land from the older generation. Social security contri-
butions are collected. During the third period of life, they receive social security beneﬁts
(indexed to past contributions) as retirees and land rents as land owners, as well as sell
the land to the next generation.
In addition to the presence of the capitalization eﬀect as a compensation mechanism,
our model diﬀers from the existing literature in several important respects. First of all,
there is only intergenerational redistribution through social security.4 Identical for all
4Any PAYG system can be divided into two parts; one implementing intergenerational redistribution
and the other intragenerational redistribution. We analyze a system which redistributes only intergener-
ationally since this part is inherently related to a PAYG system. Ineﬃciencies in the intragenerational
tax-transfer scheme can be addressed without aﬀecting the “core” of the PAYG system, namely inter-
generational redistribution.
3individuals, pension beneﬁts are a constant fraction of former contributions.5 Secondly,
there are no externalities in our model. Thirdly, we do not allow for distortions arising
from early retirement provisions. Distortions additional to intergenerational redistribution
prove to be critical sources of welfare gains in existing literature.6 In that respect, we
adopt a restrictive framework - importantly - in which existence of a Pareto-improving
pension reform has not yet been proven.
Laitner (2000) analyzes social security reform when future productivity gains are in-
corporated into stock prices. Firms have two assets: reproducible physical capital and
capitalized value of patents. Contrary to our analysis, Laitner does not consider the po-
tential of a Pareto-improving transition. Since labor supply is ﬁxed and there is no human
capital formation, PAYG contributions and beneﬁts are lump-sum. In this framework, the
PAYG system is Pareto-eﬃcient, clearly leaving no scope for analyzing the feasibility of
a Pareto-improving social security reform.7 Similarly, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (1999) consider
pension reform in an economy with land. Assuming inelastic labor supply, they analyze
the trade-oﬀ between the risk-sharing beneﬁt (due to incomplete capital and insurance
markets) and the negative eﬀects on capital accumulation of the PAYG system. They
argue that steady state generations are still better oﬀ when abolishing PAYG system.
However, as a caveat, even in the presence of perfect markets, which compensate for miss-
ing risk-sharing under a fully-funded system, a Pareto-improvement cannot be obtained
5This corresponds to social security systems in Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy and Portugal, in which
the diﬀerence in the gross replacement rate between high-income and low-income earners is at most 3
percentage points. In the U.S., the gross replacement rate decreases from 71 percent for those with a
ﬁn a ls a l a r yo f$ 20,000 to 45 percent for those with a ﬁn a ls a l a r yo f$ 50,000 (Miles and Timmermann
1999).
6Homburg (1990), Feldstein and Samwick (1998), Kotlikoﬀ (1998), and Cooley and Soares (1999b)
suggest a Pareto-improving reform analyzing a PAYG system which allows for intragenerational redis-
tribution. Their analysis is consistent with the theoretical result in Fenge (1995) since the simulated
PAYG systems do not exhibit intragenerational fairness. In this case pension beneﬁts are only loosely
linked to contributions making the system highly distortionary. The distortion created by physical capital
externalities in Belan et al. (1998) and Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbe (1997) can be addressed by a savings
subsidy without reforming the social security system (Sinn, 2000). Analogously, eﬃcient retirement de-
cisions can separately be achieved by introducing actuarial fairness at the margin (Cremer and Pestieau,
2002).
7Closely related to Laitner, Roberts (2001) considers a closed economy with exogenous labor supply
where a ﬁxed factor enters production. The paper claims to have established the existence of a Pareto-
improving social security reform, though the framework adopted does not allow for it (see the Second
Welfare Theorem). Particularly, the reform suggested in Roberts’ paper violates the resource constraint
for a closed economy. We became aware of each other’s papers in September 2002.
4for the reasons given above. Therefore, the transition generation problem is not solved
therein.
Intergenerational trade in land has important implications for the political process.
Due to population aging, pensioners receive a larger representation in the political process
which tends to preserve a generous pension system rather than allowing for a restrictive
pension reform (Boadway and Wildasin, 1989). Cooley and Soares (1999a) argue that
the interests of the working generation near retirement and pensioners are suﬃciently
closely aligned which gives rise to a political majority against privatization of social se-
curity. Hansson and Stuart (1989) even argue that social security is an implicit contract
among living generations in which the old have veto power. Pension reform thus requires
an intergenerational consensus. As shown in this paper, intergenerational trade is one
mechanism to moderate if not resolve intergenerational conﬂict among living generations
and, interestingly, to indirectly represent future generations’ interests in the contemporary
political process.
We also suggest alternative reasons for why a currently ineﬃcient social security system
c o u l dh a v eb e e ni n s t a l l e di nt h eﬁrst place. Typically, social security systems have been
introduced and increased in the 19th century and early 20th century, when other public
expenditures were much smaller. Our model suggests that an increase in the wage tax rate
collected to ﬁnance other public expenditures could alone render a social security system,
which initially beneﬁted the elderly, so costly that currently even they might beneﬁtf r o m
its partial or even full dismantling. Also, changes in the demographics, productivity
growth or interest rates may render a system previously supported at least by the elderly
unattractive also for them, opening up the possibility for an intergenerational Pareto
improvement.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model of an economy
with pay-as-you-go social security. In Section 3, we introduce social security reform
and consider the potential for Pareto-improvements. In Section 4, we present possible
explanations for the rise and fall of the PAYG system. Section 5 concludes.
52M o d e l
2.1 Production
Production in any given period t depends on the available technology and factors of
production. We assume that there are three factors of production: physical capital,
human capital and land. The amount of land is normalized to unity. Aggregate human
and physical capital in the economy in period t is denoted by Ht and Kt, respectively.
The production function is Cobb-Douglas with At reﬂecting the state of technology in






where 0 < αH,αK < 1 and αH + αK < 1. All markets are competitive, and therefore
















wt denotes the wage rate per unit of human capital in period t, r is the interest rate




where 0 < β < 1. Individual human capital stock in period t depends on investment
in education in the former period, et−1. The marginal productivity of education is dimin-
ishing and the unit cost of education is 1. The costs of education should be interpreted
broadly in the sense that they might also include the monetarized value of eﬀort cost. We
do not consider opportunity costs explicitly, as those are eﬀectively tax deductible with
proportional taxation. The aggregate stock of human capital is the product of the stock
p e rw o r k e ra n dt h en u m b e ro fw o r k e r s ,Nt,
Ht = Ntht. (3)
8We directly introduce a parameterized version of the economy needed for simulations in Section 3.
This modelling approach is without loss of generality. All qualitative results derived in Sections 3 and 4
carry over to a neoclassical production function for output and human capital.
6We assume a constant population growth rate, so that the size of the cohort working in
period t is given by
Nt = N0(1 + n)
t, (4)
where n = 0 is the growth rate of the population per cohort. While our model could be
solved also for n<0, we restrict our attention to non-negative growth rates, as negative
growth rates would imply the population of zero in the limit. Production depends also
on technology parameter
At = A0(1 + g)
t,
where g = 0 denotes technological progress. Since the pension system entails no
intragenerational redistribution, we assume identical individuals.9 Furthermore, there is
no uncertainty.
Individuals can invest their savings in the international capital market or the national
land market.10 By arbitrage, land value in period t is given by11






(1 + r)i.( 6 )
2.2 Individual Maximization
We assume a well-behaved utility function deﬁned over private and public consumption.
All individuals can save and borrow freely at the exogenous interest rate r,d e t e r m i n e d
by the international capital market, to smooth their consumption over their lifetime.
9The Appendix contains an extension to the case of individual ability diﬀerences.
10Even with integrated capital markets, full domestic land ownership could be guaranteed by foreigners
facing a small transaction cost if they were to buy domestic land, whereas there would be no transaction
cost in an international loan market. Transaction cost in foreign land acquisition might arise due to
asymmetric information on the part of investors (Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996) which tends to play a
diminished role in international loan markets.
11Though economic agents have a ﬁnite horizon, speculative bubbles are not considered as a component
of the land price. Given the presence of a ﬁxed factor, the economy turns out to be dynamically eﬃcient
which rules out the existence of bubbles (Tirole, 1985).
7Figure 1: Timing of individual actions over the life-cycle.
Therefore, following the Fisher Separation Theorem, optimal individual choices can be
characterized by a two-step optimization problem: one where individuals choose educa-
tional investment to maximize discounted net-of-tax lifetime income and a second one
where, for a given lifetime income, individuals choose their utility-maximizing intertem-
poral consumption proﬁle by borrowing and lending in the perfect capital market.12
The timing of individual actions is depicted in Figure 1.I n t h e ﬁr s tp e r i o do ft h e i r
life individuals choose their education. Human capital is supplied to the labor market
in the second period.13 The government collects social security contributions and wage
taxes at a rate τs and τw, respectively, and individuals receive a net-of-tax wage income,
[1 − (τs + τw)]wtht. Social security contributions are used to ﬁnance beneﬁts for the
current old generation whereas wage taxes ﬁnance public consumption. The middle-
aged generation invests its savings by buying land from the older generation and by
participating in the international ﬁnancial market. In the third period, individuals receive
social security beneﬁts. Formally, social security beneﬁts in period t+1, bt+1, depend on
contributions made in period t, ct = τswtht, according to the formula
bt+1 =( 1+x)ct, (7)
where x is the rate of return oﬀered by the PAYG system.14 Finally, the older gen-
eration sells land to the current middle-aged generation. Recall, as there are no credit
12Thus, welfare gains of a transition to a fully-funded system cannot originate from capital market
imperfections as is the case, e.g., in Börsch-Supan and Winter (2001).
13What is essential is that eﬀective labor supply is endogenous in the second period of life. As an
alternative to human capital formation we could assume endogenous time allocation between work and
leisure.
14Without loss of generality we assume that pensions are not taxed. If pensions were taxed, then b
would be replaced by an after-tax pension.
8constraints or uncertainty, individuals maximize their utility when maximizing the net
present value of resources available for consumption. Therefore, the individual maximiza-
tion problem facing the members of a generation working in period t and being young in



















where the ﬁrst term in brackets is the private cost of educational investment in period
t−1, the second term is the after-tax wage income in period t discounted to period t−1,
and the third term is the social security beneﬁti np e r i o dt+1, discounted to period t−1.













t−1 wt =0 ,
which gives individual educational investment in period t−1 ﬁxing wages. Using Eqs.































The social security system discourages human capital investment if the rate of return
under the PAYG system is lower than the interest rate. The rationale for this distortion
is that lending in the international capital market for one period yields a rate of return
r while compulsory savings under the PAYG system earn a rate of return x.I f t h e
latter falls below the former, the PAYG system imposes an implicit tax on contributions
equal to τsr−x
1+r which distorts human capital investment. Therefore, the combined tax
burden imposed by the wage tax and the implicit social security tax reads τ := τw +
15To simplify the exposition, trade in land does not enter the maximization problem. This is justiﬁed
by the fact that land value is exogenous from each individual’s perspective and, thus, does not aﬀect
educational investment. Furthermore, given the Fisher Separation Theorem, the saving decision does
not have to be made explicit when analyzing optimal educational investment. It exclusively serves to
implement the optimal life-cycle consumption plan.
16T h er a t eo fr e t u r np r o v i d e db yt h eP A Y Gs y s t e mx is exogenous for each individual, but endogenous
for the economy. In the next section, it is shown that x is a function of αH,αK,β,gand n.
9τsr−x
1+r. It is the implicit tax burden which is the source of ineﬃciency under the PAYG
system. Further disincentive eﬀects, e.g. due to intragenerational redistribution, are not
ingeniously generated by a PAYG system and are not considered in the model.
2.3 Steady-State Growth Path
Human capital investment is independent of land price. For any sequence of land prices
Eqs. (1), (2), (3), and (9) thus imply
ht
ht−1















1+q := (1 + g)
γ(1 + n)
αH(1−β)γ and γ :=
1
1 − αK − βαH
> 0.
T h eg r o w t hr a t eo fp r o d u c t i o n ,q, depends only on the parameters related to tech-
nological progress, population growth and technology for production and human capital
formation. It is independent of the wage tax rate, social security contribution rate or
interest rate, which aﬀect only the level of production but not its growth rate. Given by
Eq. (10), individual human capital stock increases over time if g ≥ n,o ri fg is not much
below n.I fg< <n ,t h e nht <h t−1 and human capital stock per worker would decrease
over time. However, even in such an economy aggregate human capital and output would
be still increasing.










As illustrated in Figure 2, a unique steady state V ∗










exceeds unity. The J-schedule depicts all “price-dividend” ratios consistent with arbitrage
behavior. Speciﬁcally, following Eq. (11), a positive and ﬁnite steady-state ratio of land
price to land rent arises if and only if the interest rate exceeds the output growth rate,
i.e. r>q . The steady state thus exhibits dynamic eﬃciency (Homburg, 1991 and Rhee,
10Figure 2: Steady State.
1991).17 Characterizing stability, for any value of Vt
Rt 6= V ∗
R∗, the ratio does not converge to
the steady state. Therefore, the only adjustment process consistent with perfect foresight
is a jump to V ∗
R∗ in the next period.





The rate of return under the PAYG system equals the economy’s growth rate (Aaron,







Using the land price equation (6) and the growth factor of land rents, the time path





17The result is not speciﬁc to a Cobb-Douglas production function. With a more general production
technology land continues to preclude dynamic ineﬃciency if land is essential, meaning that the income
share of land does not vanish asymptotically (Rhee, 1991).
11The factor captures the eﬀect of future output growth and discounting on current land
value and is independent of the social security system. Any change in the social security
tax rate in period t is captured in the formula for land value through a jump in land
rents in the subsequent period. Finally, the ﬁnancial position of the country vis-a-vis the
rest of the world must satisfy the transversality condition. When the net foreign assets






¢T Ft+T+1 =0(Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1996). Here, the transversality condition is
satisﬁed as the budget constraint is satisﬁed for each generation over its lifetime, and the
growth rate of production as well as of land value is less than the interest rate.
3 Social Security Reform
Formally, we assume that social security tax rates are cut by proportion ω, ω ∈ [0,1],f r o m
τs to (1−ω)τs.N or e f o r mo c c u r si fω =0whereas ω =1indicates a complete transition
to a fully-funded system. Policy reform is announced and implemented at the beginning of
the period t∗ before the current younger generation has decided on educational investment
and the elderly have sold land to the middle-aged generation.18
Both the young and middle-aged beneﬁt from social security reform. While the middle-
aged only enjoy a lower implicit tax on their contributions, the young also reap the beneﬁts
from less distorted educational investments. The preferences of the elderly are shaped by
t h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft w oc o n ﬂicting forces. On the one hand, if ω > 0 the elderly lose
due to the cut in social security beneﬁts. On the other hand, they receive an unexpected
wealth increase. The increase of human capital investment of the current young and future
generations and the implied lagged response of human capital supply increases land rents
in all subsequent periods (starting in period t∗+1). Following Eq. (12), higher land rents
generate an immediate jump in land value accruing to land owners; see Figure 3 assuming
equal slopes of Ht and Vt for expositional simplicity. As the middle-aged have already
made their investments in human capital, the value of production and wage tax revenue
in the current period does not change, neither does the land rent accruing to the elderly
18Important for our result is that land is owned by the elderly at the time of policy announcement and
implementation, which implies that both capital gains and reduced pension beneﬁts accrue to current
pensioners. Remarks on alternative timings of policy reform are brieﬂyo ﬀered in the Conclusion.
12Figure 3: Eﬀect of social security reform on Ht and Vt.
before they sell the land. In order to allow for an economic interpretation, we measure
these changes in relation to GDP. Denoting Bt the size of the social security budget in







where the parameter θ ∈ [0,1] represents the share of land owned by domestic pen-
sioners. The ﬁrst term captures the change in the PAYG beneﬁts as a share of production
and the second term indicates capital gain in land value for the elderly as a share of
production. The ﬁrst term is given by
∆Bt(·)








(1 − τs(1 − ω)(1 − z) − τw)









is the ratio between the gross rate of return oﬀered by the PAYG system and the gross
rate of return oﬀered by the ﬁnancial market. With dynamic eﬃciency, z<1.
θ > 0 proves to be a necessary condition for a Pareto-improving reform. There is
nothing inherent in the condition (13) to rule out the possibility of a social security reform
13beneﬁting the old. However, proving this requires either characterizing the circumstances
under which the condition is satisﬁed and proving that there are values satisfying these
circumstances, or providing an example of such parameter values. In this paper, political
feasibility is proved directly by providing such an example. As a baseline scenario for our
numerical analysis we choose:
αH αK β z τs τw θω
0.6 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.5 1 0.1
.
The value of z is chosen so that it corresponds closely to an annual growth rate of
productivity of 1 percent and an interest rate of 4 percent when the distance between two
generations is 20 years, and there is no population growth. The implied growth rate of
GDP is 3.5 percent.
The social security tax rate is 0.1 which proves to be a conservative estimate for
τs.19 In order to capture the distortionary eﬀect of taxes other than wage taxes such as
consumption and capital income taxes, we choose τw =0 .5 (see Mendoza et al., 1994).
Simulations are performed for ω =0 .1.
Proposition 1 An intragenerationally fair PAYG system may allow for a transition to-
wards a fully-funded system favored by the elderly if there is intergenerational trade in
land.
Proof. Condition (13) holds with the speciﬁcation αH =0 .6, αK =0 .1,β =0 .8,
τs =0 .1, τw =0 .5, ω =0 .1, θ =1 , z =0 .9.
Proposition 1 is suﬃcient to prove the existence of a Pareto-improving transition, but
not to evaluate its plausibility with other parameter values. To evaluate the plausibility
of such a transition path, we analyze diﬀerent combinations of αH,αK and β which satisfy
condition (13) keeping z, τs and τw at the benchmark level. By ﬁxing z,w eﬁxt h er a t i o
between the growth rate of the economy and the interest rate, with z<1 implying that
the economy is dynamically eﬃcient with all tested combinations.
Proposition 2 An intragenerationally fair PAYG system may allow for a transition to-
wards a fully-funded system favored by the elderly also if there is no adjustable physical
capital, but the only factors of production are human capital and the ﬁxed factor.
19For instance, in 2002 the U.S. social security tax rate amounts to 12.4 percent and in Germany it is
slightly below 20 percent.
14Figure 4: Scope for Pareto-improvement in (αH,αK) space.
Proof. Condition (13) holds with the speciﬁcation αH =0 .6, αK =0 ,β =0 .8,
τs =0 .1, τw =0 .5, ω =0 .1, θ =1 , z =0 .9.
The result of Proposition 2 guarantees that our result does not rely on the presence
of perfectly mobile and adjustable physical capital. This result even holds if some land
is in foreign ownership. The critical share of land ownership in the proof above can be
computed as θ ≈ 0.88.
Figure 4 depicts (αH,αK) combinations for varying values of β for which the elderly
beneﬁt from social security reform (parameter combinations below the respective lines).
The upper line represents all combinations which add up to unity indicating a positive
factor share of land for all values below the line. The set of parameter values allowing for
Pareto-improvement expands as β increases. Human capital investment becomes more
sensitive to changes in the net wage for higher values of β. Given complementarity in
production, this positively aﬀects future productivity of land and thus the magnitude of
the capitalization eﬀect. Furthermore, the scope for Pareto-improvement widens if αK is
reduced. Intuitively, ﬁxing αH a lower capital income share increases the factor share of
land. This magniﬁes the fraction of future eﬃciency eﬀects of pension reform capitalized
in current land price.
Figure 5 displays (αK,β) combinations for varying values of z for which the elderly
beneﬁt from pension reform (parameter combinations above the respective curves). A
reform becomes more likely Pareto-improving for higher (lower) values of β (αK)-t h e
15Figure 5: Scope for Pareto-improvement in (αK,β) space varying z.
intuition presented in the last paragraph equally applies here. The variable z<1 measures
the magnitude of the implicit tax rate imposed by PAYG. One might therefore expect
that a lower value of z eases search for reform proposals beneﬁting the elderly. As can be
inferred from Figure 5 the opposite holds true for our parameter baseline. This is because
the positive eﬀect is dominated by stronger discounting of future productivity eﬀects as z
reduces (Eq. (12)), which diminishes the scope of the asset price channel to compensate
the elderly.
The impact of wage taxation, τw, on the well-being of the elderly during pension reform
is depicted in Figure 6. Again, all parameter values above the respective curves yield
a Pareto-improving reform. Conﬁrming intuition, the ﬁgure reveals a positive relation
between pension reform proposals supported by the elderly and the level of general wage
taxation. A less pronounced general tax rate reduces the excess-burden in the economy
(convex in the overall level of taxation). The positive eﬃciency eﬀects due to partially
abolishing the PAYG system are consequently diminished and so is the capitalization
eﬀect.
Propositions 1 and 2 prove the existence of a marginal PAYG reform beneﬁting the
elderly (ω =0 .1). However, even with a full transition, intergenerational trade in land
may be suﬃcient to compensate current pensioners for lost beneﬁts.
Corollary 1 Social security reform may be Pareto-improving even with a full transition
16Figure 6: Scope for Pareto-improvement in (αK,β) space varying τω.
to a fully funded system.
Proof. Condition (13) holds with the speciﬁcation αH =0 .6, αK =0 .1, β =0 .8,
τs =0 .1, τw =0 .5, ω =1 , θ =1 ,a n dz =0 .9.
The presence of technological progress or population growth is not necessary to im-
plement PAYG reform, as Proposition 1 implies also that:
Corollary 2 Reducing the social security tax rate may result in a Pareto improvement
even without technological progress or population growth.
Proof. With g =0and n =0 , any value z<1 c a nb ea t t a i n e db yv a r y i n gr.
Given by Corollary 2, a social security reform may exist which is supported by the
elderly even in a stationary and dynamically eﬃcient economy with an intragenerationally-
fair PAYG system.
Finally, we should notice that there is a further welfare gain from increased future
public expenditures. As the wage tax rate is kept constant, increased production implies
increased tax revenue as a result of a decreasing social security tax rate. Therefore, ﬁnding
a reform proposal supported by pensioners would be an easier task if we were to ﬁxt h e
revenue requirement for public expenditures, instead of ﬁxing the wage tax rate used to
ﬁnance them.
174 The Rise and Fall of the PAYG System
Our analysis in the previous section raises a legitimate question: If the elimination of a
PAYG system could be a Pareto improvement, why would such a system exist? It is not
plausible that a PAYG system would have been implemented in the ﬁrst place if it did
not beneﬁtt h eo l d e rg e n e r a t i o na tt h a tt i m e .T h ec r e a t i o no faP A Y Gs y s t e mc o u l db e
explained, outside our model, by arguments like the inability of the poor to save for their
retirement in the 19th century. However, even our basic model captures some obvious
candidates for why the PAYG system could have beneﬁted the elderly in the ﬁrst place, but
lost its appeal subsequently. One such candidate is unequal distribution of land ownership.
The poor, older citizens without assets would favor a PAYG system, as they are not hurt
by the eﬃciency loss capitalized in land value. Therefore, an increasing middle-class
with widespread stock ownership might contribute to the eroded popularity of the PAYG
system among the elderly. Another obvious candidate is the secular increase in other
public expenditures. An increased tax burden implies higher distortions, and increases
the cost of maintaining a PAYG system. As the increase in the welfare state during the
20th century was not anticipated when the social security system was introduced, the
elderly could have supported its introduction then, but now beneﬁt from its abolishment
even if nothing else than the general wage tax rate had changed. We summarize this
argument as
Proposition 3 If the elderly are indiﬀerent between τs and (1 − ω)τs, ω > 0,w i t ha
given wage tax rate e τ
w, then they would strictly prefer (1 − ω)τs with all τw > e τ
w.
Proof. The elderly being indiﬀerent to a reduction of social security tax rate by
ωτs,ω > 0, implies that θ > 0, as otherwise the elderly would always strictly prefer a
higher social security tax rate. With wage tax rate e τ
w,




(1 − τs(1 − ω)(1 − z) − τw)






Diﬀerentiation of the left-hand side with respect to τw yields




(1 − τs(1 − ω)(1 − z) − τw)
(1 − τs(1 − z) − τw)
¶γβαH−1 τsω(1 − z)
(1 − τs(1 − z) − τw)2.
18As this is positive with any ω > 0, an increase in the wage tax rate is suﬃcient to
induce the elderly to favor a cut in the social security tax rate.
As a corollary, Proposition 3 implies:
Corollary 3 If the elderly are currently indiﬀerent between maintaining the current social
security system or eliminating it, they would have favored its establishment with any given
lower level of wage tax rate.
In addition to changes in the wage tax rate, changes in technological progress, popula-
tion growth rate as well as the interest rate can aﬀect the attractiveness of social security
reform through their eﬀects on z. Even though we have not been able to determine that
Eq. (14) would be monotonic in z,w eh a v e :
Proposition 4 An increase in the level of technological progress has qualitatively the
same eﬀect on the attractiveness of social security reform as an increase in the population
growth rate or a reduction in the interest rate.
Proof. Follows from deﬁnitions of z and q.
Our numerical analysis suggests that increasing z widens the prospects of Pareto-
improving pension reform through diminished discounting. This is a surprising ﬁnding,
as it implies that a reduction in the population growth rate (lower z), and therefore an
increase in the dependency ratio, would actually reduce the scope for a Pareto-improving
reduction in the social security tax rate. Given our baseline, demographic change aﬀects
asset prices in a diﬀerent way than previous literature has focused on. Therein the higher
rate of return under a fully-funded system might partially be eroded by population aging
since future pensioners have to sell ﬁnancial assets to a smaller generation of young in-
vestors when liquidating their portfolios; see Abel (2001) and Poterba (2001)f o rac r i t i c a l
evaluation of the “meltdown” hypothesis. In the present paper, equilibrium land price in
each period is not directly aﬀected by a change in the ratio of the number of suppliers to
demanders. Instead, negative demographic shocks reduce asset returns in each subsequent
period due to lower steady state growth which immediately capitalizes in asset prices.
195C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we demonstrate that the scope for Pareto improvements in social secu-
rity systems is wider than previous literature suggests. In earlier literature, the Pareto
improvements in PAYG systems rely on externalities or intragenerational redistribution.
However, both absent, Fenge (1995) and Brunner (1996) argue that a Pareto improving
transition from a PAYG system is not possible. We show that this might not be the case in
an economy with a ﬁxed factor of production, here labeled as land. As land value captures
future land rents, intergenerational trade in land allows the pensioners of the transition
generation to participate in the beneﬁts of reducing the social security tax rate. Even a
PAYG system without distortions due to intragenerational redistribution may allow for a
Pareto improvement, especially if the taxation to ﬁnance other public expenditures has
increased after the PAYG system was created.
There are important caveats when drawing policy implications. First of all, the simula-
tions are suggestive and are not meant to be calibrated to a speciﬁc economy. Secondly, an
asset value eﬀect may also introduce unexpected ineﬃciencies. Poutvaara (forthcoming)
demonstrates in a model without social security that the older generation may voluntar-
ily provide an ineﬃciently high amount of public education for the younger generation in
order to beneﬁt through higher land prices. A more policy-oriented analysis should cali-
brate the factor shares of ﬁxed and adjustable physical capital, as well as the production
function for human capital. As the eﬀects of the PAYG system may depend crucially on
other taxes, it would be desirable to replicate the essential features of the tax system in
numerical analysis. This exercise, as well as modeling asset price eﬀects through a reval-
uation of existing physical capital (as common in tax reform analysis; see e.g. Altig et
al., 2001) is left to future research. Applied to social security reform, the last extension is
likely to strengthen our paper’s ﬁndings since it opens up an additional intergenerational
link through which the current elderly have a stake in future productivity gains.
Independently of whether the actual economies would allow for a Pareto improving
reform or not, our paper oﬀers several policy conclusions. Increased tax burden moves
the interest of asset-owning retirees closer to those of working cohorts, while expected
reductions in the size of the public sector could close a window of opportunity to reform
20social security systems. Furthermore, our paper suggests that taxing capital gains above
t h en o r m a lr a t eo fr e t u r nc o u l db eu s e dt oﬁnance eﬃciency-improving reforms boosting
future productivity.20 Such compensation mechanism would be needed if the elderly do
not own the land, or if the social security reform is announced prior to its implementation.
In the latter case beneﬁts and costs of the reform accrue to diﬀerent generations in the
absence of capital gains taxation. As a ﬁnal policy conclusion, voting behavior of the
elderly depends on how land ownership is distributed amongst them. Even if all citizens
had identical productivity, they may have diﬀerent voting incentives if they have unequal
amounts of land, say due to diﬀering amounts of inherited wealth. The possibility of
reforming social security may arise when an increased number of the elderly become
members of the capitalist class owning productive assets. As reported in Poterba et al.
(2001) such development has indeed taken place during the last decades in the U.S. On
the other hand, international portfolio diversiﬁcation may render reforming social security
system more diﬃcult. This would support investing private pension funds in the domestic
market, in order to increase the stake that the elderly have in future eﬃciency gains.
6 Appendix: Social Security Reform with Heteroge-
neous Population
In this appendix, we analyze the conditions under which the results from Section 3 hold
in an economy in which people diﬀer in their ability and in their asset ownership. Let us
divide the working population in period t into I groups (i =1 ,..,I), so that individuals
in any group (t,i) share the same ability and asset ownership characteristics. We deﬁne
ability as individual ability to absorb and eﬀectively utilize investment in human capital.
Am e m b e ro fg r o u p(t,i) being a worker in period t has ability ∞ >a t,i > 0. Instead of




in which et−1,i is investment in human capital in period t−1 by individuals belonging
20As a ﬁrst step in this direction, asset price eﬀects (due to a ﬁxed factor) induced by tax reform are
considered in Keuschnigg (1994). However, a rationale for capital gains taxation to solve intergenerational
conﬂict is not developed therein.
21to the ability group (t,i).T o r e ﬂect the empirical fact that workers belonging to high-
income groups often have more expensive education, we assume that the cost of creating
human capital stock at,ie
β
t−1,i equals at,iet−1,i. The number of workers belonging to the
ability class (t,i) is nt,i. We normalize the measure of ability so that the average ability
is unity in each period, implying that
P
i nt,iat,i = Nt. Replacing et−1 by et−1,i and the




t−1,i in the individual maximization problem (8) and
solving the ﬁrst-order conditions for diﬀerent ability classes i yields identical investments
in human capital b et−1,i. Through adopting this normalization, this translates into an
aggregate stock of human capital in the economy and factor prices both of which are
identical to the case without heterogeneity.
What remains to be analyzed are the welfare eﬀects of a social security reform for dif-
ferent ability classes. Subsequently, we denote the share of domestically-owned land held
in period t by the elderly members of the ability class (t − 1,i) by ψt−1,i. Corresponding
to Section 3, we can now derive the condition under which social security reform beneﬁts












Nt−1 denotes the share of social security beneﬁts belonging to ability
class (t − 1,i).I f
nt−1,iat−1,i
Nt−1 = ψt−1,i, the results from Section 3 can be generalized to an
economy with a heterogeneous population. In this case, land ownership is distributed in
the same way as wage income and, importantly, social security beneﬁts.







, which is the ratio of the share of land owned by the members
of ability class (t − 1,i) to its share of wage income in period t−1, which is again equal to
its share of social security beneﬁts in period t. Let us denote the minimum value of these
ratios in period t by λt−1. If all land is owned domestically and asset ownership is perfectly
correlated with wage income, then λt−1 =1 . If land ownership were to be distributed
either less or more equally than wage income and entitlement to social security beneﬁts,
then this disparity would reduce scope for a Pareto-improvement in the absence of capital
gains taxation above the normal rate of return on ﬁxed asset holdings. For instance,
22starting at the parameter baseline, the critical value for λt−1 becomes ≈ 0.95.21 Disparity
is not allowed to be too large in order to achieve a Pareto-improvement for each ability
class. If λt−1 drops below the threshold level, there is demand for capital gains taxation
in order to redistribute the aggregate increments in land value (exceeding the reduction
in the social security budget) intragenerationally to achieve Pareto-improvement for all
households.
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